INTRODUCTION
The starting point of this paper is that the South African Government has so many conflicting priorities that it has been overcome by policy incoherence between 2000 and 2004. ABSTRACT: In the past, the main obstacle against building network infrastructure was the cost. Technological advances, however, have meant that building a functional, low-cost network is possible. Knysna is the first municipality in South Africa to achieve this. The problem is not the infrastructure but the connection to the larger networks of the mobile and fixed-line operators. The incumbents' incentives are to prevent interconnection (or at least to delay it) on the basis of maintaining their dominance. In the telecommunications sector in South Africa, the only way to overcome this problem is via regulation. Yet regulation has to balance two sometimes competing interests -investment in infrastructure and competition. The Knysna Uni-Fi project has operated outside of any enabling regulation for competition and investment and this has negatively impacted upon its commercial success. Any regulatory intervention imposed upon the market has to balance the interests of competition and investment. In the South African market, given the huge dominance by the incumbents, that balance must change to favour new entrants. Until this takes place Knysna is not a replicable model for South Africa.
1 In a paper written by Alison Gillwald (Gillwald, 2005) , she argues that South Africa's policy intentions of affordability and accelerated sector development were nullified by implementation plans that emphasised the maximisation of state assets through the protection of the vertically integrated incumbent, first for the privatisation and subsequently for the IPO, at the expense of competition.
allowed Value Added Network Services (VANS), to compete against the incumbent and to self-provide their facilities, which they had been required by law to acquire from the incumbent. However, despite a gazetted interpretation of the directives by the regulator, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), that removed any possible ambiguities, the Minister issued a press release the day before the directives were to come into force in 2005 indicating that VANS operators could not self provide. Notwithstanding this legally tenuous situation the VANS operators chose not to challenge the press release. The press release of January 2005 marks a watershed in the history of telecom reform in South Africa. It marks the culmination of the incoherent policy statements issued by Government.
During this period of incoherence, the municipality of Knysna decided that it could no longer pay the exorbitant rates of Telkom. It put out a tender for the creation of a separate network to supply its internal needs, mainly connecting its local branch offices. The municipality also had wider social objectives such as the provision of free voice and Internet access to the community. As such there were two phases to the Knysna project: firstly, connecting the various branches of the municipality and secondly, delivery of free Internet and voice calls to those within the community.
The Knysna Uni-Fi project took place within a context of policy incoherence. The success of the first phase of the Knysna Uni-Fi project speaks to the possibilities that could occur on a wider scale, but that policy incoherence has actively thwarted. It is precisely because Knysna ignored the machinations of both the regulator and Government that it was successful. 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE CO-OPERATION WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The Knysna Wi-Fi project is best described as a public-private partnership (PPP)
between the town council of Knysna and UniNet. The town council of Knysna put out a public tender that was innovative in that it included both local Government as well as commercial requirements. The local Government requirement was for all the branches of the municipality to be connected, including geographically isolated branches such as Sedgefield, which is about 20 kilometres from Knysna (UniNet, 2005) . Commercial requirements included the ability to provide free VoIP calls and
Internet hotspots within the municipality.
UniNet proved to be able to deliver the best pricing and quality guarantees (Jarvis However, in view of the special relationship with the city of Knysna, more is at stake here than the usual commercial Wireless Internet Service Provider (WISP) selling its services. The council is the largest client and its key aim is to lower the municipality's communications costs. UniNet guarantees Quality of Service (QoS) to the municipality. But it also has to meet certain obligations with regard to universal access and social and economic development of the city. There is, after all, a significant poverty gap in Knysna (Jarvis D, 2005 personal interview, 04 November).
UniNet has certain network obligations in the informal settlements and rural areas around Knysna.
The council, too, has obligations, in the form of monthly payments to UniNet. The 
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Source: Based on a presentation by Richardson, G. (2005) NETWORK SPECIFICATIONS AND SERVICES In addition, each CPE also has one 2.4GHz sector antenna (802.11b/g) for the local hotspot with a reach of 1,5km. In the last segment an extra fixed line is also provided. The network uses little power and works on solar energy.
NETWORK TOPOLOGY KNYSNA
Source: Based on a presentation by Jarvis (2005) The council uses the VPN connectivity for Internet, an intranet, and VoIP Emergency calls are also conducted by means of the same network. The figure above shows a schematic representation of the network. 
POLICY AND REGULATORY ASPECTS
At the time that the contract was awarded, under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, UniNet had a VANS licence with which it was able to offer network services, but not to build its own infrastructure. This ministerial decree formed the basis for the Uni-Fi project in Knysna.
Unfortunately, the effect of policy incoherence was that a press statement was released on 31 January 2005 stating that it was never the Minister's intention to allow VANS to become self-sufficient. This came as a surprise to ISPs and gave rise to enormous confusion. The argument, which smaller ISPs such as UniNet supported, was that the press statement issued by the Minister had no legal force in the face of the ministerial determination (McCleod, 2005) . According to Jarvis the confusion was therefore spurious and merely served as ammunition for Telkom.
He was correct. The press statement by the Minister had the affect of shutting down any self-provisioning plans by ISPs. But the affect was farther reaching than mothballing business plans. It entrenched the belief amongst ISPs that there was no point in challenging the Government because the rules of the game changed to suit The net result was that the Uni-Fi project was caught between a rock and a hard place. On the data side it is forced to use the Telkom network at some point to gain access to the Internet. Providing an Intranet would save the Knynsa municipality a lot of money, but did not make the Uni-Fi project any more commercially viable in the long term. On the voice network, it is reliant upon interconnection to either the Telkom network or to the mobile networks, at highly inflated prices.
REGULATORY THEORY
Nearly all regulators realise that the most effective mechanism to achieve affordable pricing and high penetration levels is competition. Competition delivers on these policy objectives by encouraging innovation and allowing the process of creative destruction to take place: does the cosier world of cartels and monopoly" (Stelzer, 2007, p.143) .
Internationally, one of the main goals for municipalities to provide Wi-Fi networks is to encourage innovation and which, in turn, spurs economic growth (Van Audenhove et al, 2007) . If creative destruction is going to be allowed to operate within the telecoms arena in South Africa, then dominant practices by incumbent operators that prevent competition have to be curtailed. Along with the market definition process as laid out in the EU's Access Directive, the open access model is gaining momentum as a potential solution to the problem of ensuring that new entrants are able to enter a market that exhibits high structural barriers to entry. Cave (2006) provides a cogent explanation of the process of getting new entrants to increasingly invest in infrastructure and thus lay the foundation for competition to incumbents (and thus for the process of creative destruction).
What is remarkable about the Knysna Uni-Fi project is that investment has taken place outside of any national framework for investment. In fact, the practical reality is that investment in the sector by new entrants has been actively discouraged, either through law or by policy fiat. However, as Cave (2006) points out, a hierarchy of infrastructure assets can be made based on the ease of replication. What is lacking in Knysna is the ability to break out into the national network and the key obstacle to this is the lack of any effective and enabling regulatory framework.
What is needed is a dynamic approach to regulation as demand changes and costs vary according to innovation. The recently released draft interconnection and facilities leasing regulations provide a step in the right direction by providing access to facilities of dominant operators, but these regulations exist in a policy and regulatory vacuum. There is no clear statement of intent by either the Government or the regulator to encourage access for new entrants.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the odds against municipal networks, it is remarkable that the Uni-Fi project has been at all successful. A significant factor in the Uni-Fi project's success is the The regulator has to balance competition and investment in the sector. At the moment, the balance is so skewed towards the incumbents that new entrants in the national market stand no chance. The national success of Knysna-like projects is dependent upon regulatory intervention that supports new entrants, and since there is little sign of any coherence entering the telecommunications policy at the moment, the replicability of the Knysna model is under question.
